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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MYRA O. GUTIERREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48507-2020
Cassia County Case No.
CR-2014-2820

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Myra Gutierrez failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked her probation and executed the underlying sentence?
ARGUMENT
Gutierrez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
Gutierrez admitted that she doused her ex-boyfriend’s car in lighter fluid and then lit it on

fire. (PSI, pp.4-5.) The state charged Gutierrez with one count of third-degree arson and one count
of burglary. (R., pp.22-23.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Gutierrez pled guilty to burglary. (R.,
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pp.42-43, 47-49.) In exchange for her guilty plea, the state dismissed the arson charge. (R., pp.47,
72-73.)
On October 21, 2014, the district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three
years fixed. (R., pp.63-66.) The court suspended Gutierrez’s sentence and placed her on probation
for two years. (R., p.65.) Approximately six months later, the state filed a motion for bench
warrant, alleging eight probation violations.

(R., pp.74-80.)

Gutierrez absconded from

supervision before the alleged violations were adjudicated. (See Tr., p.3, Ls.6-22.)
Nearly six years later, on November 9, 2020, Gutierrez admitted that she absconded
probation in February of 2015 and that she had violated her the terms and conditions of her
probation by moving without first obtaining permission. (Tr., p.7, L.20 – p.9, L.9; see R., p.78.)
The state then agreed to withdraw the remaining allegations. (Tr., p.8, Ls.10-14.) The district
court revoked Gutierrez’s probation and executed the underlying sentence. (Tr., p.15, Ls.4-7; R.,
pp.83-87.) Gutierrez timely appealed. (Tr., pp.95-96.)
On appeal, Gutierrez asserts the district court abused its discretion when it revoked her
probation and imposed the underlying sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) Review of the record
and proper application of the relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The trial court’s decision to revoke probation will not be disturbed on appeal absent an

abuse of discretion.” State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312, 1 P.3d 809, 813 (Ct. App. 2000)
(citations omitted). The Court “reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by determining whether the
trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
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specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v.
Smith, 168 Idaho 463, ___, 483 P.3d 149, 1006, 1019 (2021) (internal quotation omitted).
C.

Gutierrez Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
“The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under

proper control and supervision” while also providing adequate protection for society. State v.
Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977); State v. Kerr, 115 Idaho 725, 726, 769
P.2d 602, 603 (Ct. App. 1989). “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate
protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995).
“If the trial judge reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that probation is not
achieving its rehabilitative purpose, probation may be revoked.” State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49,
50-51, 844 P.2d 31, 32-33 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted); see Idaho Code § 20-222
(authorizing the revocation of probation at any time if the probationer violates any condition of
the probation). Probation is not meeting the objective of rehabilitation and is not providing
adequate protection for society where the defendant absconds from probation. See Chavez, 134
Idaho at 312-13, 1 P.3d at 813-14 (holding the district court acted within its discretion when it
revoked probation because the probationer absconded probation).
In determining whether the trial court properly revoked probation, the Court “examines all
the circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the
sentence, including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and
the revocation of probation.” State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672, 962 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Ct. App.
1998). The “focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke
probation.” State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Gutierrez’s probation and
executed the underlying sentence. The district court found that Gutierrez absconded probation for
over five years. (See Tr., p.13, Ls.22-24; p.14, Ls.18-21.) During those five years, Gutierrez lived
completely unsupervised. Her probation officers – and by extension the court – had no way of
determining whether she was abiding by the terms and conditions of her probation, engaging in
further criminal conduct, or making rehabilitative progress. (See Tr., p.14, L.22 – p.15, L.3.)
Because Gutierrez had failed “to comply with any probation in any meaningful way,” the court
concluded that probation had not achieved the goal of rehabilitation, that reinstating probation was
not consistent with the goal of protecting society, and thus that she was not a viable candidate for
probation. (Tr., p.13, L.24 – p.14, L.7; p.15, Ls.4-7.) The district court’s comments demonstrate
that it recognized the issue of revocation as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of its
discretion, acted consistently with the applicable legal standards, and reached its decision to revoke
Gutierrez’s probation by an exercise of reason.

Therefore, the court’s decision to revoke

Gutierrez’s probation and execute the underlying sentence was not an abuse of discretion.
Gutierrez concedes that she absconded probation. (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) Nonetheless,
she asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked her probation and executed
the underlying sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) Gutierrez argues that certain mitigating
information (such as her age, minimal criminal history, and the fact that she has no history of
substance abuse or mental health issues) weigh in favor of reinstating her probation or placing her
on a period of retained jurisdiction. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) Her argument lacks merit.
The district court adequately considered mitigating information in determining whether to
impose the underlying sentence or retain jurisdiction. The district court expressly stated that it had
reviewed the PSI, which contained relevant information regarding Gutierrez’s age, criminal
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history, lack of substance abuse issues, and lack of mental health issues. (Tr., p.13, Ls.16-17; PSI,
pp.10-13, 19-27.) The court weighed this information against the fact that Gutierrez absconded
probation for more than five years as well as other factors such as the need for general and specific
deterrence. (Tr., p.14, Ls.8-17.) The court reasonably determined that absconding probation
merited “some pretty serious consequences” in order to satisfy the need for deterrence, even in
light of the mitigating information contained in the PSI. (Tr., p.14, Ls.11-21.) Given Gutierrez’s
decision to abscond probation for five years and thereby escape accountability for her actions while
she was supposed to be under the close supervision of a probation officer, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it revoked Gutierrez’s probation and executed the underlying sentence
even in light of any mitigating information. Gutierrez has failed to show otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of June, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
KILEY A. HEFFNER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

JRP/dd

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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